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Abstract—Dependability benchmarking has become through
the years more and more important in the process of systems
evaluation. The increasing need for making systems more de-
pendable in presence of perturbations has contributed to this fact.
Nevertheless, even though many studies have focused on different
areas related to dependability benchmarking, and some others
have focused on the need of providing these benchmarks with
good quality measures, there is still a gap in the process of the
analysis of results. This paper focuses on providing a first glance
at different approaches that may help filling this gap by making
explicit the criteria followed in the decision making process.
I. INTRODUCTION
For many years the evaluation of a system’s features made
reference to the evaluation of those related to its performance.
Nevertheless, the need for providing dependable systems in
presence of perturbations, has lead to a current state of affairs
in which many people from both academia and industry
evaluate the dependability of systems, in addition to their
performance, with comparison and selection purposes. This
process, usually known as dependability benchmarking in the
research community, has been tackled in many works in the
literature where it is applied to different application domains,
such as web servers [1], on-line database transactional sys-
tems[2], or automotive systems[3], among others.
Most of these works base their benchmarking process on
the guidelines established in [4], so as to ensure portable, scal-
able, and non-intrusive procedures that may lead to repeatable
and reproducible experiments. Other works, like [5], focus on
dependability measurement to integrate into existing depend-
ability benchmarking processes the common practice followed
in metrology. But even though remarkable studies can be found
on how to evaluate dependability features in many different
systems [6], when it comes to analyse the results obtained in
the experiments in order to provide meaningful conclusions,
it can be found that evaluators base their conclusions in their
own criteria. This presents a problem when different evaluators
want to compare their results with the ones presented in
another work. This fact has been pointed out in studies like [7]
where, among other things, raw data from different experi-
ments and evaluators can be shared, analysed and correlated
to obtain good quality measures. However, the purpose of
this paper is not focused on data sharing or obtaining quality
measures from experimentation, but in pointing out a fact that
is present in most dependability benchmarking related works
performed so far, and that in our knowledge has not been
properly considered yet, the conclusions reproducibility.
After analysing many works from the literature, like those
presented in [6], it can be observed that the most commonly
followed approach consists in presenting the raw measures
(computed from the raw measurements/data obtained for each
experiment) characterising different system’s features, and
drawing some conclusions from them. The process of how to
compute measures from measurements is usually detailed in
depth to show the correctness of such process and enabling
other researchers to obtain the same measures. However,
as mentioned before, conclusions are usually based on the
evaluator’s criteria (which is not a bad thing), but the process
on how the measures are analysed to provide such conclusions
is usually missing, making sometimes hard to understand
how the evaluator has come up with them. It is known
that in order to compare the results obtained from different
experiments, all results must have been obtained following the
same process, otherwise comparing them would not provide
meaningful conclusions. Thus, a question raises: ”starting
with the same results, can we consider useful two different
conclusions obtained through different criteria?” Well, this is
not a yes/no answer, it depends. All conclusions extracted from
results may be right according to a certain criteria, or wrong
according to another, and here is where lies the importance of
making explicit the considered criteria in the analysis process.
When reviewing dependability benchmark analyses where
the criteria used to obtained the conclusions are missing,
external evaluators may disagree with these conclusions, and
thus state that the work is not correct. But if the criteria were
explicitly defined, external evaluators could understand the
reasoning behind those conclusions and thus argue about the
analysis process, but not about the work done.
Section II shows a brief analysis of i) different possi-
ble profiles for evaluators, who are the consumers of those
conclusions drawn from dependability benchmarking studies,
and ii) the different techniques applied that lead to those
conclusions. An example that illustrates the benefits of using
decision support techniques and the lacks covered by them is
presented in Section III, followed in Section IV by a discussion
about the feasibility of introducing these methodologies into
the common dependability benchmarking process. Finally, the
main challenges to be faced are summarised in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND
The number of measures obtained when evaluating a sys-
tem is usually related to the difficulties found to present the
results to end users. For that reason, many benchmarks provide
a single score for each system. For instance, when observing
the different set of benchmarks provided by the Embedded
Microprocessor Benchmark Consortium (EEMBC) [8], all of
them get a whole bunch of measures (16 in the case of
EEMBC’s AutoBench 1.1) but provide a single global measure
(Automark for EEMBC’s AutoBench 1.1) for a system by
calculating a geometric mean with all the given measures.
But, when providing a set of measures, it should be taken into
account that there are different evaluator profiles that may need
to consume these measures. For example, while people from
academia may want as many individual measures as possible
to exactly determine the effect of certain improvements or
new configurations in a system, people from industry, in
the other hand, could prefer a single global measure for a
straight comparison among competing Commercial Off-The-
Shelf (COTS) to be integrated into the system. Likewise, there
will probably be some other users requiring more than a single
measure, to be able to analyse a system according to different
perspectives, but not tens of measures, which make the analysis
really hard and often meaningless.
There are different approaches to represent and analyse the
multiple measures obtained from evaluation. Although each
approach has its own particularities, all of them have to face
a common problem: how to characterise decision criteria
within a friendly and usable model. Choosing a certain kind
of representation for measures has important consequences in
terms of expressiveness. Simplistic approaches may skew in
excess the representation of the model, whereas representations
with a high expressiveness can add unnecessary complexity
to the model or can be cumbersome in its use for decision
making. Therefore it is important to find an equilibrium
between representing as much information as possible and
maintaining a good degree of usability.
Measures aggregation is a common approach usually ap-
plied in the community of dependability benchmarking to ease
the comparison among systems. However, it is surprising that
so far there is still a lack of unified criteria when addressing
the aggregation of measures and their subsequent analysis.
Common methods applied by users for aggregation range
from simple mathematical operations (e.g., addition, arithmetic
mean or geometric mean) to more serious and systematic
distribution fitting [9] and custom formulae [10] approaches.
Kiviat or radar diagrams [11] are graphical tools that repre-
sent the results of benchmarks in an easy-to-interpret footprint.
They can show different measures using only one diagram and,
although some training is required, the comparison of different
diagrams is fairly simple. The scalability of Kiviat diagrams
enables the representation of up to tens of measures. However,
managing such a huge amount of information may difficult the
interpretation and analysis of results. The problem previously
stated is solved in [12] throughout the use of an analytical
technique named the figure of merit which, imposing certain
restrictions to the graph axes, synthesises all the measures into
a unique numerical value associated to the footprint shape.
However, the problem of this solution, as it happens with most
techniques using the mean or the median, is that valuable
information could be hidden behind a unique number, and
consequently, the comparison between systems could result
quite vague [13].
Generally, these techniques focus just on aggregating re-
sults and do not provide any insights on how to cope with the
interpretation of issuing scores. Nevertheless, there are other
techniques that can be used to aggregate the measures while
making explicit the decision criteria followed. One of these
techniques is the Logic Scoring of Preferences (LSP) [14],
a method for combining a large number of criteria into one
score. In order to achieve this, an aggregation tree has to be
built, where the leaves of this tree are the raw measures. An
elementary criterion is defined for each measure, where each
criterion has a minimum and a maximum value that define the
interval containing the accepted values for each specific mea-
sure. The values of the obtained measures are then normalized
according to these (minimum and maximum) thresholds. All
the measures are aggregated into higher-level features using
operators and weights that determine the contribution of each
low-level measure to the higher-level one. The final result is a
global score that can be used to compare the evaluated system.
Yet another technique that makes explicit the decision
criteria is the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) [15]. This
technique is widely used in other contexts as a decision
making process. As happens in the LSP technique, measures
are aggregated using a decision tree, where the leaves are the
raw measures and the root is a global score for the system.
All the measures are compared two-by-two to determine their
contribution to the higher-level criterion. This contribution is
obtained by computing the principal right eigenvector of the
matrix containing the result of the two-by-two comparison.
This process is recursively applied to all levels of the decision
tree, thus ending with a global score (priority) for each system
that allows their comparison.
As can be seen, exiting aggregation techniques can be
classified in those just providing a single score, thus enabling
a straightforward comparison of systems, and those based
on a hierarchical aggregation of measures, usually in a tree-
like form, which enables the navigation from raw measures
to a single scores through different levels. Although simple
aggregation approaches have been used along the years in the
field of dependability benchmarking, it is surprising to note
that more complex schemes have not been considered yet.
Accordingly, it is necessary to study to what extent they could
fulfill the requirements of benchmark evaluators and thus prove
their suitability for this domain.
III. PROOF OF CONCEPT
In order to show the difference between making explicit
or not the decision criteria when analysing dependability
benchmark results, this case study makes use of the results
obtained in [16], where authors evaluate the behaviour of an
ad hoc network in presence of perturbations. For this example,
a small subset of the measures obtained in the work are used
to ease the understanding of the whole process. Nevertheless,
studies applying these techniques to a large set of measures
can be found in the literature like in [17].
The results in Table I represent the measures obtained
from an ad hoc network in presence of one of the following
attacks: Replay attack, Flooding attack and Tampering attack.
Due to the adaptation capabilities of ad networks, the system
kept working in presence of the injected perturbations, but
their impact could be observed on the system’s performance
and dependability degradation. The selected measures for the
example are described next:
Availability
Percentage of time the communication route es-
tablished between sender and receiver is ready to
be used.
Integrity
Percentage of packets whose content has not been
unexpectedly modified.
Throughput
Average throughput of the network in kilobits per
second.
TABLE I: Measures obtained from the study done in [16]
Measure Replay Flooding Tamperingattack attack attack
Availability (%) 75.20 65.00 90.33
Integrity (%) 99.44 98.23 62.90
Throughput (Kbps) 70.90 80.18 96.45
Obtained measures will be analysed by two different eval-
uators using two different techniques to aggregate the results,
and determine which attack impacts the network the most. The
first evaluator (Ev1) will aggregate the results obtained using
a geometric mean (like it is done in the EEMBC), while the
second evaluator (Ev2) will use the LSP technique described
before.
The main purpose of Ev1 is to compare the system’s
behaviour in presence of perturbations in an easy way, so
the geometric mean suits perfectly for this purpose. The
scores obtained by Ev1 after aggregating the measures through
Equation 1 are shown in Table II.
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Availability ∗ Integrity ∗ Throughput (1)
Ev2 is using the LSP technique, which explicitly defines the
reasoning behind the decision process through a mathematical
model. The decision criteria followed by Ev2 to aggregate the
measures is depicted in Figure 1 as an aggregation tree. Avail-
ability and Integrity measures are aggregated into a higher-
level feature of the system called Dependability, and Integrity
has been considered of more importance than Availability to
determine the Dependability of the system. It is to note that this
is just taken as an example of aggregation, and it does not mean
that these two measures represent the dependability of the
system as defined in [18]. Ev2 also considers that to determine
a global score for the system, Dependability is slightly less
important than Performance.
In the aggregation tree, Min and Max values represent the
threshold values that define the interval of accepted values
for each measure. The M inside a circle, represents the mean
operator, but many different kind of operators can be used
depending on the evaluator’s requirements. A deeper analysis
Fig. 1: Aggregation tree defined by the second evaluator (Ev2)
to determine the system score
of these operators is performed in [17], where up to 20 different
operators are defined. Table II shows the scores obtained by
Ev2.
TABLE II: Scores obtained by the first (Ev1) and second
evaluators (Ev2)
Evaluator Replay Flooding Tamperingattack attack attack
Ev1 80.9359 79.9971 81.8329
Ev2 80.9859 77.2679 55.5521
The different analyses performed by both evaluators lead
them to different conclusions. From the results obtained by
Ev1, the conclusion is that all the attacks have a similar impact
on the system, with the “tampering attack” being slightly more
benign, whereas the results obtained by Ev2 show that the
“replay attack” has the lowest impact of the three attacks, being
the “tampering attack” the most dangerous. As can be seen
from this simple analysis, contradictory results can be obtained
from the same set of results just because the interpretation pro-
cess has not been accurately predefined. Nevertheless, this does
not mean that one conclusion is right and the other is wrong.
The purpose of the example was to prove that there are other
methodologies that can be applied for the analysis of results
that provide much more information about the criteria followed
by the evaluator when presenting experiment’s conclusions.
Indeed, Ev2 can also take decisions based on intermediate
results issued from the hierarchical aggregation of measures.
For instance, the “replay attack” still has the lowest impact on
the system from a Dependability viewpoint (according to the
defined high-level feature). However, when just considering the
Performance of the system (the other high-level feature), the
“tampering attack” is the one providing the best scoring but,
as previously described, is the worst case when considering
the system as a whole.
It is easy to perceive that different aggregation techniques
may lead to different conclusions, but there are other problems
that may arise from the absence of information about the
criteria used. For example, Ev3 represents another evaluator
willing to analyse the data shown in Table I using the LSP
methodology. Ev3 presents the same aggregation tree that Ev2,
and also the same thresholds for the different measures but, in
this case, Ev3 is considering Dependability far more important
than Performance. Figure 2 depicts the aggregation tree with
the weights established by Ev3, and Table III lists the scores
obtained after measures aggregation.
Fig. 2: Aggregation tree defined by the third evaluator (Ev3)
TABLE III: Scores obtained by the third evaluator (Ev3)
Evaluator Replay Flooding Tamperingattack attack attack
Ev3 72.8638 58.7766 57.2866
As can be appreciated from the results shown in Table II
and Table III, both evaluators (Ev2 and Ev3) provide the same
classification when ranking the perturbations from low to high
impact on the system: i) “Replay attack”, ii) “Flooding attack”,
and iii) “Tampering attack”. This example points out the need
of making explicit the criteria followed by the evaluator when
analysing the results, because whereas Ev3 is considering
that Dependability features are more relevant to determine
the quality of the system in presence of perturbations, Ev2
considers Performance metrics slightly more relevant and, in
both case, the same ranking is obtained. Thus, not provid-
ing an explicit definition of the decision process may lead
readers to misunderstand the reasoning followed to obtain the
conclusions, resulting in misleading results when the wrong
decision making process will be applied to future experiments
performed by that people.
IV. DISCUSSION
Usually, the criteria used by evaluators is subjective and
is determined by the application context of target system.
This means that, when evaluating a web server that accesses
a database in presence of attacks, for example, the criteria
used to extract conclusions from results obtained should not
be the same if that server that manages an industry’s private
information than if it manages posts in a cooking blog. So, this
context is very important and must be taken into consideration
when specifying the decision making process to be followed.
However, while some of the presented methodologies lack the
means to support approach (like Geometric mean or Kiviat
diagrams), methodologies like LSP or AHP not only make
explicit the criteria used for measures aggregation, but also re-
move any possible uncertainty in the process, as mathematical
models would present less ambiguities than natural language.
A hierarchical representation of the analysis, which enables
the navigation from coarse-grain (global score) to fine-grain
(raw measures) through medium-grain (intermediate features)
viewpoints, opens the doors to evaluators with many different
profiles. For example, i) developers may get as many raw
measures as desired to have a complete and detailed picture of
the system under development, ii) administrators may prefer
having a reduced number of aggregated scores characterising
different features of the system while tuning its configuration,
whereas iii) end users with low expertise may obtain just a
single score characterising the quality of the deployed system.
Although the benefits of these approaches seem indu-
bitable, there are a lot of questions still to be solved, like
i) how to integrate decision making processes in the common
dependability benchmarking process, ii) in case of method-
ologies being complementary, how can they be combined to
make the most of them and ease the decision making process,
or iii) in case of methodologies being exclusive, in which
scenarios should each of them be applied. Accordingly, there
is still a long way to go before the dependability benchmarking
community embraces these practices.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Along the years, dependability benchmarking has evolved
into a mature discipline with applicability in many different
areas. Most related works focused on the specification of clear
guidelines for the definition and execution of dependability
benchmarks, whereas others introduced well formed processes
to define good quality measures for the evaluation processes.
Nevertheless and although the main goal of these benchmarks
is to compare and select among different products or systems
those providing the best trade-off between performance and
dependability, paradoxically no effort has been devoted yet
to provide an accurate and unambiguous decision making
process. Common aggregation processes followed to evaluate
systems in dependability benchmarking lack rigorousness and
vary continuously from one work and evaluator to another.
In many cases, the decision criteria applied to analyse the
resulting measures is not made explicit, thus making more
difficult the fair comparison of results obtained in different
experiments and/or by different evaluators.
This work can be considered as a first step forward to pave
the way for integrating decision making methodologies into the
dependability benchmarking process to enable the conclusions
reproducibility.
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